Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State by Owen, Adrian et al.
Detecting Awareness in the
Vegetative State
Adrian M. Owen,1* Martin R. Coleman,2 Melanie Boly,3 Matthew H. Davis,1
Steven Laureys,3 John D. Pickard2
T
he vegetative state is one of the least un-
derstood andmost ethically troublesome
conditions in modern medicine. The term
describes a unique disorder in which patients
who emerge from coma appear to be awake but
show no signs of awareness. Although the
diagnosis depends crucially on there being no
reproducible evidence of purposeful behavior in
response to external stimulation (1), recent func-
tional neuroimaging studies have suggested that
Bislands[ of preserved brain function may exist
in a small percentage of patients who have been
diagnosed as vegetative (2). On this basis, we
hypothesized that this technique also may pro-
vide a means for detecting conscious awareness
in patients who are assumed to be vegetative
yet retain cognitive abilities that have evaded
detection using standard clinical methods.
In July 2005, a 23-year-old woman sustained a
severe traumatic brain injury as a result of a road
traffic accident. Five months later, she remained
unresponsive with preserved sleep-wake cycles.
Clinical assessment by a multidisciplinary team
concluded that she fulfilled all of the criteria for a






imaging (fMRI) to mea-
sure her neural responses
during the presentation
of spoken sentences
(e.g., BThere was milk
and sugar in his cof-





ty was observed bilat-
erally in themiddle and
superior temporal gyri,
equivalent to that ob-
served in healthy vol-
unteers listening to the




(e.g., BThe creak came
from a beam in the ceiling[) produced an ad-
ditional significant response in a left inferior
frontal region, similar to that observed for normal
volunteers. This increased activity for ambiguous
sentences reflects the operation of semantic pro-
cesses that are critical for speech comprehension.
An appropriate neural response to the mean-
ing of spoken sentences, although suggestive, is
not unequivocal evidence that a person is con-
sciously aware. For example, many studies of
implicit learning and priming, as well as studies
of learning during anesthesia and sleep, have
demonstrated that aspects of human cognition,
including speech perception and semantic pro-
cessing, can go on in the absence of conscious
awareness.
To address this question of conscious aware-
ness, we conducted a second fMRI study during
which the patient was given spoken instructions
to perform two mental imagery tasks at specific
points during the scan (3). One task involved
imagining playing a game of tennis and the
other involved imagining visiting all of the
rooms of her house, starting from the front
door. During the periods that she was asked to
imagine playing tennis, significant activity was
observed in the supplementary motor area
(Fig. 1). In contrast, when she was asked to im-
agine walking through her home, significant
activity was observed in the parahippocampal
gyrus, the posterior parietal cortex, and the lateral
premotor cortex (Fig. 1). Her neural responses
were indistinguishable from those observed in
healthy volunteers (fig. S2) performing the same
imagery tasks in the scanner (SOM text).
These results confirm that, despite fulfilling
the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative
state, this patient retained the ability to under-
stand spoken commands and to respond to them
through her brain activity, rather than through
speech or movement. Moreover, her decision to
cooperate with the authors by imagining partic-
ular tasks when asked to do so represents a clear
act of intention, which confirmed beyond any
doubt that she was consciously aware of herself
and her surroundings. Of course, negative find-
ings in such patients cannot be used as evidence
for lack of awareness, because false negative
findings in functional neuroimaging studies are
common, even in healthy volunteers. However,
in the case described here, the presence of re-
producible and robust task-dependent responses
to command without the need for any practice or
training suggests a method by which some non-
communicative patients, including those diag-
nosed as vegetative, minimally conscious, or
locked in, may be able to use their residual cog-
nitive capabilities to communicate their thoughts
to those around them by modulating their own
neural activity.
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Fig. 1. We observed supplementary motor area (SMA) activity during tennis
imagery in the patient and a group of 12 healthy volunteers (controls). We
detected parahippocampal gyrus (PPA), posterior parietal-lobe (PPC), and
lateral premotor cortex (PMC) activity while the patient and the same group of
volunteers imaginedmoving around a house. All results are thesholded at P G
0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons. X values refer to distance in mm
from the midline in stereotaxic space (SOM text).
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